Skydance Paramount should probably be a ~$4 stock because, unlike Paramount and Warner Bros. Discovery, it cannot break up or sell; the only way out is through. It starts almost 7x levered, needs mid-single-digit growth and $6B of synergies from two gutted companies, and interest is 150% of FCF as rates rise. Generative content and short-form video are existential threats, and any revenue decline makes sports rights unaffordable. Netflix has ~30% odds of a shot at the WB studio in a bankruptcy. … Show more

Paramount Skydance's credit stress adds to its downside risk. Per ZeroHedge, its CDS has surpassed Lehman-era highs; the shares look headed toward their 2009 lows, and a break of those lows would mean bankruptcy. More broadly, stocks are returning toward 2009 lows, not merely below 2020 lows. x.com 

Paramount Skydance's debt levels are unsustainable in a rapidly changing entertainment industry. Its cost of capital is too high and the numbers it assumes are not attainable, making it the entertainment version of the Titanic. Bloomberg, quoted by @carlquintanilla, reports angry calls from money managers to the banks that underwrote the debt, with paper losses on the investment-grade notes alone topping $100 million. x.com 

Paramount Skydance has 50-100% upside if its Warner Bros. Discovery merger looks likely to go through, odds that are only beginning to be priced in. At a market cap of about $8-9 billion, the stock still sits in bankruptcy territory, because a failed merger would essentially bankrupt Paramount, which cannot survive long on its debt. Big money will be made or lost on it, most likely made. x.com 

CoreWeave's bond trading is an ominous signal because it needs capital markets to stay wide open. Its bonds are trading like Viacom's during the Bill Hwang era; the compute cycle looks good for now, but continued funding access is uncertain. x.com  x.com 

CoreWeave's stock may already reflect much of its real financing risk amid extreme pessimism. Its unsecured bonds yield distressed rates and CDS spreads have surged, while Q2 net interest expense was $640M and 2026 capex guidance is $35–39B. Q2 revenue was $2.58B with about $104B of backlog, but whether that demand yields shareholder value after financing, depreciation and reinvestment remains uncertain; attractive financing is central to the case. x.com 

CoreWeave's near-15% yield on its 2032 debt makes the share decline look warranted. Its CEO called the share drop irrational, but the bond market's signal is more persuasive; the debt is the part to watch. x.com  x.com 

CoreWeave's high bond yield and CDS suggest its heavy debt could make future funding costlier and leave equity exposed after creditors. The 15%+ bond yield appears to be a market yield, not the cost of existing debt; debt exceeds roughly $35B. Long hyperscaler contracts help, but do not erase the leverage and credit-stress gap versus Nebius, which also has a large backlog. ASML says chip scarcity could last to 2028, so providers with live capacity could benefit. x.com  x.com 

Charter is drowning in debt, and that leverage outweighs its cash-flow appeal. @k3ithmccullough puts Charter at a 25% free-cash-flow yield by 2028. The most bullish point is that capex is expected to come down, but on a quick look the heavy debt load makes the stock look very poor. x.com 

Rising bond yields could destroy Oracle's business model because its $500 billion in RPO depends on funding the projects with debt and equity; without that money, the RPO does not matter. Its debt yielding close to 8% is a canary, and the model mirrors SunEdison's: it works until it doesn't. A falling stock could make three more years of heavy capex prohibitive, and without AI growth the shares could spiral, possibly forcing Larry Ellison to sell stock to back his Paramount debt guarantee. x.com  … Show more