Disney's problems stem from a lack of aggressive moves in content, and its cable business needs to go. Spinning out ESPN would address that, rather than blaming the $71B Fox acquisition as @DividendsCoffee suggests. x.comÂ
Ross Gerber
CEO of Gerber Kawasaki, Portfolio Manager of GK ETF
Disney's improved fundamentals against a compressed P/E make the shares a coiled spring. Revenue is climbing 5-10% yearly, net income rose from $2 billion to $12 billion, and margins expanded while the stock has not reached a new all-time high in six years. That is a six-year discount with sixfold better fundamentals. x.comÂ
Skydance Paramount should probably be a ~$4 stock because, unlike Paramount and Warner Bros. Discovery, it cannot break up or sell; the only way out is through. It starts almost 7x levered, needs mid-single-digit growth and $6B of synergies from two gutted companies, and interest is 150% of FCF as rates rise. Generative content and short-form video are existential threats, and any revenue decline makes sports rights unaffordable. Netflix has ~30% odds of a shot at the WB studio in a bankruptcy. … Show more
Disney's old IP thesis was wrong because its business has been too capital-intensive as run this century. Even buying at the exact lows over roughly 12 years would have meant losing badly to inflation. Re-entry would only make sense if Disney changed its operating model, perhaps even through a split. x.comÂ
Disney's stock has gone nowhere since 2015 even as the business grew substantially. Revenue doubled, its cruise fleet doubled from four to eight ships, Disney+ and Hulu became a streaming powerhouse, parks hit record revenue and attendance, and it broke the record for highest-grossing animated film three times. x.comÂ
Durable entertainment IP is a special niche, because it is rare to confidently predict a high-margin product's relevance 20 years out. The clearest examples are Nintendo with Mario, Comcast with Harry Potter, Netflix with NFL and college sports, Spotify, Amazon Prime and Disney's animated movies. Many can be owned, though some are purer plays and some cheaper than others. x.com x.comÂ
Disney looks like a dead stock walking as it raises streaming prices again on a service with little to no new content and many more commercials. Subscribers seem unlikely to keep paying, which is probably why management stopped reporting subscriber numbers. x.comÂ
Netflix's valuation is still far from cheap for its growth profile, at over 20 times cash flow and 6 times sales, so the stock's continued fall after solid quarterly results is justified. After the failed Warner acquisition, Netflix still lacks timeless franchises and brands, and sequels to its own productions regularly disappoint and fall short of Disney and Warner quality. The stock is not worth touching even around $60. x.comÂ
Comcast's Peacock spinout could reveal value because Peacock has grown faster than Netflix to 48 million subscribers, with structurally lower costs. Its $1 billion EBITDA run rate is twice Netflix's at that subscriber count in 2014. A library, theatrical windows, ISP/CDN delivery, ISP customers and Xfinity upsells help. At 7x earnings, valuing Peacock, media and parks like 2014 Netflix leaves roughly $30 billion in RemainCo EBITDA against $51 billion in remaining market cap. x.com x.com x.comÂ
Disney is a dog with fleas. Absurdly high theme-park prices face demand elasticity as a weakening consumer in a K-shaped economy pulls back. Its movie lineup is dated, with live-action Moana joining Snow White as box-office bombs; its balance sheet carries heavy debt from poorly conceived acquisitions that could curb park spending; and AI threatens several businesses. There is a price for everything: below $90, reward versus risk turns favorable. x.com x.comÂ
Disney is a buy now that Bob Iger, its biggest liability because he would not let go, has stepped aside. Its parks drew about 145 million visitors last year, more than any country, including France at about 100 million. x.comÂ