Dan
Small-Fund Manager
SpaceX's 800 MHz spectrum purchase does not solve indoor penetration, so its claim of complete US phone coverage does not pass the sniff test. The spectrum gives only a weak indoor signal, and SpaceX says its direct-to-device service doesn't work indoors. Elon Musk called it the last critical piece of the spectrum puzzle, but competing would need more midband spectrum or a deal with a mobile or cable operator, so it looks like a pressure tactic to force such a deal. x.com x.com x.com x.com x.comÂ
SpaceX remains unattractive: its reported $8 billion spectrum deal covers only a tiny fraction of what a nationwide wireless network would require, even with expensive satellites that last just five years. x.comÂ
SpaceX's $2T valuation may price in orbital data centers that remain a distant vision. Its operating business is essentially a scaled neocloud and internet provider, raising the question of whether current operations justify that valuation. x.comÂ
SpaceX's satellite network should let Starlink Mobile provide equivalent cellular service with far less terrestrial infrastructure than other carriers. Acquiring some cell towers therefore makes sense. StockSavvyShay says SpaceX is in talks to secure at least 80,000 US cell sites. x.comÂ
Anti-SpaceX demand could bring AST SpaceMobile and Amazon a lot of business. If Avery Sullivan's interpretation of AST's E-band filing as a push into consumer broadband is right, that would be huge for AST. x.comÂ
SpaceX's AI-cloud ambitions face a severe two-sided constraint: finding 12 GW of Rubin capacity in one year looks implausible, and even that buildout would need customers willing to rent roughly $50B of compute annually. The scale of both the supply and demand challenges makes the plan highly skeptical. x.comÂ
SpaceX's near-monopoly in global satellite internet, built on reusable rockets, should generate enormous cash flow to partly fund its AI compute buildout. Those cash flows should strengthen its credit profile and let it finance the rest more cheaply than pure-play neoclouds CoreWeave, Nebius and IREN, which SpaceX makes obsolete. Grok ensures deployed compute earns revenue if customers back out. There is no reason to own a pure-play neocloud when SpaceX is available. x.com x.comÂ
Orbital data centers may take far longer than investors expect, if they happen at all. SpaceX sells compute on Earth and invests in power and cooling there, widening the hype-reality gap. SpaceX, Rocket Lab, AST SpaceMobile and Redwire could be dead money for years while the vision catches up. x.comÂ
AT&T's leadership appears to underestimate the SpaceX threat. In a clip circulated by another account, its CEO reportedly called rocket reusability a dream; dismissing SpaceX this way looks like sleepwalking into the incumbent carrier's demise. x.comÂ
Slower neoclouds such as CoreWeave face an uphill battle against SpaceX's faster data-center buildout. Demand may be effectively unlimited, but falling a year or two behind creates a $5-10B cash cost disadvantage they may not survive. Some could still pull off a miracle; SpaceX itself competes as a neocloud and has no reason to buy firms that cannot build data centers. x.com x.com x.comÂ
SpaceX's 10 GW compute target demands enormous capital spending. It alone would have to reach $500B in capex to meet the goal. x.comÂ