Musk's Starlink decisions and implausible guidance put SpaceX shareholders at risk. He is throttling Starlink in Ukraine and issuing SpaceX guidance he will never hit. His conduct harms his shareholders more than that of any other company. x.com 

AST SpaceMobile has more of a moat abroad where Starlink cannot operate. The Ukraine-Starlink dispute is likely to keep Starlink out of the EU and other markets. In the US, the thesis rests completely on mobile network operators that appear to need AST to fight Starlink. AST never had an overall moat, and it should be further ahead by now. x.com  x.com 

T-Mobile, AT&T and Verizon look vulnerable to Starlink's prospective entry as a mobile carrier: the incumbents have grown complacent and milked customers for too long. Starlink should disrupt them, favoring SpaceX. x.com 

SpaceX's neocloud-driven valuation is vulnerable to short-notice compute contract exits. Losing contracts with 90-day out clauses could cut $500B from its valuation; at least one out clause appears to be coming in 2027 rather than 2029. Neocloud expectations drive 80% of its current valuation, despite earlier fundraising on Starlink, reusable rockets and Mars. What happened to Amazon in 2000-02 is about to happen to SpaceX by 2030-32. x.com  x.com 

SpaceX's valuation is at risk if foreign governments push back on Starlink the way they are now pushing back on Palantir, and that pushback is already starting. @RnaudBertrand notes France and Germany's intelligence services replaced Palantir with local firm ChapsVision, Germany's military will stop using it, and Spain told state-controlled companies to avoid new Palantir contracts, as countries refuse structural dependence on US technology. x.com 

Slower neoclouds such as CoreWeave face an uphill battle against SpaceX's faster data-center buildout. Demand may be effectively unlimited, but falling a year or two behind creates a $5-10B cash cost disadvantage they may not survive. Some could still pull off a miracle; SpaceX itself competes as a neocloud and has no reason to buy firms that cannot build data centers. x.com  x.com  x.com 

SpaceX's expansion could dilute shareholders and flood the spot market with compute capacity, making 2027 a potential disaster despite this quarter's results. A large share of its proposed capacity would go to the spot market, unlike Meta's internally used capacity; valuing it as if peak spot prices last forever ignores that risk. SpaceX should be down, not up, on that outlook. x.com  x.com  x.com  x.com 

SpaceX's effort to make satellite-only coverage count toward buildout requirements casts doubt on its terrestrial-network pitch. It is spending considerable energy seeking that option while saying it plans to build a terrestrial network. x.com 

SpaceX's near-monopoly in global satellite internet, built on reusable rockets, should generate enormous cash flow to partly fund its AI compute buildout. Those cash flows should strengthen its credit profile and let it finance the rest more cheaply than pure-play neoclouds CoreWeave, Nebius and IREN, which SpaceX makes obsolete. Grok ensures deployed compute earns revenue if customers back out. There is no reason to own a pure-play neocloud when SpaceX is available. x.com  x.com 

SpaceX's growing connectivity profit improves its business case, but spending still leaves self-funded growth unproven. Starlink users rose from 12m to 13.6m and ARPU from $66 to $69; connectivity earned $2.4B of $2.8B operating profit. The $4.4B net profit includes non-operating and tax gains, while AI's operating margin is about 5.7%. Quarterly capex exceeded revenue at $19.6B, with $35-40B planned for Q4. Valuation still requires evidence of cash returns. x.com