Fundamental Investor
Fund Manager
Shake Shack makes almost no money on about $1.5B of annual revenue despite its brand and traffic, and its overhead is not scaling. Per AlphaSense, Q1 revenue rose 14.3% to $366.7M and same-Shack sales rose 4.6%, but adjusted net income was just $0.1M with a $2.6M operating loss. G&A and D&A per store are about the same as in 2015 with 30 units; allocating costs to corporate makes the restaurants look profitable without real expense leverage. x.com x.com x.comÂ
Shake Shack's plan to grow revenue 50% over the next three years is unlikely to work out well for shareholders because the chain already has major quality-control problems. Recent personal visits have been bad. x.comÂ
Shake Shack is still too expensive at about 40x forward earnings, a premium valuation to pay right now. That pushes back on a post the author replies to, which turned bullish on Shake Shack because everyone was dunking on it. x.comÂ
Shake Shack is starting to look cheap after a sharp selloff on beef-cost and consumer worries, despite solid growth and margins. Q2 revenue grew 17.2%, restaurant-level margins reached 23% and free cash flow is positive. It owns no real estate, so it is a bet on the brand, restaurant economics and expansion across its 703 restaurants. The key question is whether those margins hold as it grows. x.comÂ
Mid-tier restaurant chains like Shake Shack and CAVA face rising input costs they will struggle to pass on. Cattle prices are at an all-time high, and the war is set to raise packaging costs alongside surging transportation costs, driven partly by oil and mostly by CDL licensing rules. Low-end chains McDonald's and Yum keep pushing value pricing to win back consumers, limiting mid-tier pricing power heading into earnings. x.comÂ
Restaurants are struggling, making Red Robin unattractive to own. Former restaurant ownership and complaints from restaurant-owner friends underpin the short view. x.comÂ
Shake Shack is an asymmetric setup: at about 1x sales with a 20%+ restaurant-margin model and $4m AUVs, upside far exceeds downside. Intact unit economics and its balance sheet let it keep adding stores through a slowdown from weak travel, low-end consumers, GLP-1s and inflation, unlike Portillo's balance-sheet or Sweetgreen's model problems; McDonald's did likewise in 2008-09. Same-store sales should stay solidly positive this year when most chains' won't. Execution lags; downside is maybe 30%. … Show more
Portillo's is a case of insiders dumping shares on public markets, and its struggles reflect incompetent management. Founder Dick Portillo sold out to private equity in 2014, which then unloaded the company on public investors. Five years after the IPO, its roughly $8 million average unit volume still has not produced profits. x.com x.com x.com x.comÂ
The Cheesecake Factory at 25 times next-twelve-month earnings looks attractive as a short. Restaurant valuations can be highly cyclical, though past fast-casual names reached 55 times earnings with 20% growth. x.com x.comÂ
Shake Shack remains a long-term position despite cutting its guidance, citing uncertainty and competition. The second-quarter result was not surprising, but the lift needed in the second half looks hard to achieve. x.comÂ
Restaurant stocks, including Chipotle and Wingstop, are uninvestable right now, with too many better places for money. Most have slowing growth, rising costs and poor margins. Wingstop's growth and margins look better than most, but it is still not a buy. x.com x.comÂ
