Late Stage Capitalism
Physician, Long-Term Stock Investor with 30 Years of Experience
Snap is not investable until its entire C-suite and board are replaced, because current leadership cannot turn a profit. Even with 971 million monthly users, usage does not matter without profitability. Stock-based compensation remains a drag; reported costs may look better only because the low share price makes new awards cheaper, while the number of shares awarded may be rising. x.com x.com x.com x.com x.com x.comÂ
Snap's long-term future is in doubt because new users may not exist. Snapchat's distribution, reaching one in eight people, is the bull case, but it is unclear where its user base will be in 10 years, why Canva ranks ahead of it and whether it can age up. It looks like the ultimate acquisition target given that distribution, but it needs to make that happen soon, and it is unclear whether CEO Evan Spiegel can do it. x.com x.comÂ
Social media bans for young users, now introduced in the UK after Australia, should hurt Snap far more than Meta. Apps in general are unappealing investments. x.comÂ
Snap's European monetization is improving even without user growth. Q2 revenue per daily user rose 36%, from $2.65 in 2025 to $3.62 in 2026, while daily users slipped from 100M to 98M. That leaves room to generate more revenue from the existing audience rather than relying on explosive user growth. x.comÂ
Snap is an eternal value trap: cheap on paper, but weighed down by regulatory headaches, TikTok eating its lunch and endless dilution. x.comÂ
Snap is a red flag that does not put shareholders' interests first. Its growth comes mainly from countries with low pricing power while it plateaus or declines in the West. It has long diluted shareholders in a way that enriches its founders, and the CEO and his co-founder control over 90% of voting rights, leaving shareholders powerless. It should have been acquired when it had the chance. @Ashton_1nvests sees a path from about $6 to $20 or more. x.comÂ
Snap's Spectacles cannot deliver meaningful commercial value within five years, making a funding partner essential to avoid years of cash burn. At best, they are a prototype, with zero chance of profitability in the next couple of years; the glasses will never sell at the scale needed to make a difference. Without a partner, Snap stock is dead money. Even so, Snap remains a good asymmetric bet on Evan Spiegel changing course, with little downside from here if he does not. x.com x.com x.com x.comÂ
Snap is in a bad position when Pinterest is now the better business of the two. x.comÂ
Snap is a bad business that is cheap for good reason, and its latest quarter confirms it. Q1 EPS was -$0.05 versus $0.09 expected, revenue merely met estimates and Q2 revenue guidance is roughly in line. It ended its Perplexity relationship and expects $95-130 million of restructuring charges after cutting 16% of staff, aiming to remove over $500 million of annualized costs in the second half. The app is among the worst around, and management credibility is poor. x.comÂ
Snap is slowly turning into a subscription software company, with Snapchat+ revenue up 87% in Q1 to $285 million, nearly 19% of total revenue versus 11% a year ago and now a $1 billion annual run rate. The price target is $14. x.com x.comÂ
Snap does not deserve to be compared with Reddit; it remains a far weaker business. x.comÂ