Hermès' leather business underpins its resilience because it is the category the company controls most. Its most impressive Q3 result was about 10% organic leather growth while peers struggled; overall growth was 4.3% in Q3 and 5.5% over nine months despite challenges in the Middle East, China and France. The valuation pays for mid-single-digit growth when few luxury peers are growing, with somewhat less upside in a boom. x.com  x.com 

LuxExperience is a fundamentally challenged business: an online department store for designer brands has little value proposition when it relies on the ultra-wealthy, who can buy direct from brands at full price with more certainty and a better experience. A post the author replies to notes the top few percent of customers drive 40-50% of spend. It may be the best operator left, but the case rests on it being cheap if things turn, and a recession would hit it hard. x.com 

Hermès and LVMH are a tough long pitch at about 30x earnings while the luxury slump stays broad-based. Per alphaportai, LVMH's business units are struggling across spirits, leather goods and perfume. Hermès is a little better and looks to be taking some share in leather goods. Buying luxury when it is distressed would be appealing, and this is not a reason to short Bernard Arnault, but a 30 P/E is hard to accept. x.com  x.com  x.com 

Ferrari, Hermès and LVMH are the perfect anti-AI investments because the rich, and those who want to be rich, love these brands. x.com 

L'Oréal's results show its resilience, its appeal and that its premium valuation is justified. Per @Loris_Dalleau, who expected 1-2% growth, the release came in well above expectations. x.com 

LVMH still looks somewhat expensive despite falling about 50% over three years. A 20x P/E is not cheap given weak recent quarters and falling sales. Management's performance has been disappointing, and new risks are starting to emerge. x.com 

Nike, like other apparel makers, is uninvestable because a durable moat is near impossible in this business. Consumer preferences keep changing, requiring constant new marketing to keep people excited, and making a physical product leaves an inherently low-margin business with little long-term pricing power. A major turnaround is possible, but the business model gives no confidence in its long-term strength. x.com 

Swatch Group is cheap on the balance sheet but expensive on the income statement, which is why the stock has gone nowhere for fifteen years. Inventory, real estate and cash alone exceed its market cap, and gross margins near 80% show real brand pricing power. But high fixed costs from vertical integration and heavy reliance on one country cut net margin from 13% in 2015 to 0.25% in 2025. Hype launches like MoonSwatch and the AP Royal Pop, which crashed 72% on resale, do not move earnings. x.com  … Show more

LVMH may struggle to fix its problems because Louis Vuitton, a key brand, is losing its appeal. Gen Z and aspirational buyers are no longer interested in entry-level LV leather goods, and anecdotally the top 1% now view the brand poorly. Fashion and Leather Goods organic growth was -1% in H1 2026, with sequential declines in Asia and Europe; Dior is still doing well. @MRougemont counters that it is a Europe problem, with new LV products selling well in the US. x.com  x.com  x.com  x.com  x.com 

Estée Lauder is a great business in a bad cycle, and the best time to buy a leader is when its industry is intact and its price isn't. Revenue grew from $6.5 billion to $17.7 billion over 16 years as net income compounded 9.5% a year, until China, about 30% of sales but under 20% of global premium beauty spending, hit the brakes and the stock fell 87%. Premium cosmetics, a repeat-purchase category, should grow 6.3% a year to over $200 billion by 2030; analysts expect three years of recovery. … Show more